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I. INTRODUCTION
“Who decides whether class arbitration is available?” This seemingly simple question has
fueled much litigation and is hotly debated between the Federal Courts of Appeals. This question
also implicates other foundational questions: “Is class arbitration a proper remedy in this case?”
“Is class arbitration a good tool to resolve disputes?” “Are the class-action waivers that lead to
the use of class arbitration conscionable?” “Is the use of arbitration clauses in consumer,
employment, and other contracts between large organizations and single persons a just practice?”
This article does not presume to answer any of those questions. Instead, this article
examines a very narrow issue that has caused a substantial circuit split: “Is incorporation of the
American Arbitration Association (AAA) rules in an arbitration clause a proper delegation of
authority to the arbitrator to decide whether class arbitration is available?” The solution to this
problem, and to the class arbitrability delegation problem in general, is important because it will
determine how many claims go to class arbitration. Arbitrators are more likely to decide that
class arbitration is available because they believe they can handle the challenge and can bill
much more time in a class arbitration. Courts, meanwhile, will embrace the Supreme Court’s
skepticism against class arbitration and rule that it is not available. Therefore, a resolution on this
issue will have a profound impact on the number of class arbitrations filed and resolved.
I begin with a brief examination of the background of arbitration, the delegation doctrine,
and class arbitration. Then, I examine the Supreme Court’s treatment of class arbitration and the
question of who decides class arbitrability. Next, I define the different positions the federal
circuits have taken on the AAA incorporation question, which has resulted in a four to three
circuit split. Finally, I propose my own resolution of the split, analyze the Supreme Court’s likely
solution, and examine possible effects of that decision.
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II. BACKGROUND: ARBITRATION, DELEGATION, AND CLASS ARBITRATION
a. Brief History of Arbitration
Arbitration is a quasi-judicial alternate dispute resolution process where the parties agree
to present their dispute to a neutral entity (generally one person or a panel of three) to issue a
binding decision on the merits of the case. 2 Clauses requiring arbitration are a common feature of
modern consumer agreements, employment contracts, and website terms and conditions.
Arbitration is often preferred to litigation in commercial contexts because it is cheaper and faster
than litigating a lawsuit, and the ability to choose the decision-maker means the parties can
ensure the arbitrator has subject-matter knowledge. 3
In the first century and a half of American jurisprudence, judges were loath to enforce
agreements to arbitrate signed before the dispute arose because they infringed on the jurisdiction
of the courts to resolve disputes. 4 To counteract this hostility, the United States Congress passed
the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) in 1925. The Act holds agreements to arbitrate disputes are
“valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the
revocation of any contract.” 5 It also allows a party to petition a court to compel arbitration 6 and
to confirm arbitral awards. 7 Parties can also ask a court to vacate or modify an award under
limited circumstances. 8

2

Rush Prudential HMO, Inc. v. Moran, 536 U.S. 355, 382 (2002).
Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds Int’l Corp., 559 U.S. 662, 682–83 (2010).
4
Kulukundis Shipping Co. v. Amtorg Trading Corp., 126 F.2d 978, 982 (2d Cir. 1942).
5
Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. § 2.
6
Id. at § 4.
7
Id. at § 9.
8
Id at §§ 10–11; see, eg. Lawrence R. Mills & Thomas J. Brewer, “Exceeded Powers”: Exploring Recent Trends in
Cases Challenging Tribunal Authority, 31 ALTS. TO HIGH COST LITIG. 113 (2013) (finding vacatur in around 20% of
petitions).
3
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Arbitrations are often conducted through arbitral organizations. One of the most
prominent is the American Arbitration Association (AAA), a group founded in 1926 to provide
an out-of-court solution to resolve disputes. 9 The AAA publishes and maintains a variety of rules
that are often incorporated into arbitration clauses, even if the arbitration will not be
administered by the AAA. Unless otherwise stated, incorporating AAA rules into an arbitration
clause is an incorporation of the Rules of Commercial Arbitration. 10
The Supreme Court initially maintained some skepticism about arbitration after the FAA
was ratified. 11 Starting in the 1980s, though, the Supreme Court has held consistently in favor of
binding arbitration agreements, finding that the FAA supported an overall “federal policy
favoring arbitration.” 12 Supreme Court and the federal circuits have found this policy to overrule
traditional contract defenses such as lack of mutual assent, 13 unconscionability, 14 and the
inability to vindicate rights. 15 Courts have also found this policy to overrule constitutional
defenses based in the Fifth Amendment Due Process Clause 16 and the Seventh Amendment right
to a civil jury. 17 The Supreme Court’s expansive support for arbitration has resulted in the
common use of arbitration clauses in adhesive contracts, because the drafters can be sure that the
clauses will be enforced, and it is highly unlikely that the courts will step in to interfere.

9

AAA Mission Statement, AM. ARB. ASS’N, www.adr.org/mission (last visited Dec. 23, 2019).
Commercial Arbitration Rules and Mediation Procedures, Am. Arb. Ass’n, 10 (rules effective Oct. 1, 2013),
https://www.adr.org/sites/default/files/Commercial%20Rules.pdf [hereinafter AAA Commercial Arbitration Rules].
11
See, e.g. Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427, 436–37 (1953) (finding that arbitration could not be compelled in a claim
brought under the Securities Act because arbitration did not allow full vindication of the plaintiff’s rights).
12
See, e.g. Moses H. Cone Mem’l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24–25 (1983) (“questions of
arbitrability must be addressed with a healthy regard for the federal policy favoring arbitration. . . . [A]ny doubts
concerning the scope of arbitrable issues should be resolved in favor of arbitration, whether the problem at hand is
the construction of the contract language itself or an allegation of waiver, delay, or a like defense to arbitrability.”).
13
Meyer v. Uber Techs., Inc., 868 F.3d 66 (2d Cir. 2017).
14
Chavarria v. Ralphs Grocery, Inc., 733 F.3d 916 (9th Cir. 2013).
15
Am. Express Co., v. Italian Colors Rest., 570 U.S. 228 (2013).
16
Davis v. Prudential Sec., Inc., 59 F.3d 1186 (11th Cir. 1995).
17
Janiga v. Questar Cap. Corp., 615 F.3d 735 (7th Cir. 2010).
10
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b. Delegation of Authority Between Courts and Arbitrators
However, there is one question where courts consistently assert their authority over
arbitration: whether and how the parties agreed to resolve their dispute through arbitration in the
first place, and whether a court or arbitrator decides these questions. These questions are split
into “substantive” arbitrability (whether the parties agreed to arbitration in the first place) and
“procedural” arbitrability (the specific procedures to be followed in arbitration). Courts
presumptively decide questions of substantive arbitrability unless the parties clearly and
unmistakably delegate otherwise. 18 If there is such a delegation, the decision of whether a
specific dispute is subject to arbitration will be decided by the arbitrator(s). 19 The courts’ power
over the arbitral process only applies to these “gateway questions” of whether the dispute goes to
arbitration at all. Once it is found or agreed that a dispute will be arbitrated, all question of
“procedural arbitrability” will be decided by the arbitrator, who is presumably better suited to
determine what procedures will best fit the situation. 20
c. Class Arbitration
Emerging in the 1980s, 21 class arbitrations allow a party to file and proceed with an
arbitration for or against a class in a manner similar to class-action lawsuits. Class-action
lawsuits, authorized by Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, allow parties to assert a
claim on behalf of or sue a class of parties “so numerous that joinder of all parties is
impracticable,” among other criteria. 22 Class action suits are often filed on behalf of a group of

18

Howsam v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 537 U.S. 79, 83 (2002) (quoting AT&T Tech., Inc. v. Commc’n Workers,
475 U.S. 643, 649 (1986)).
19
First Options of Chicago, Inc. v. Kaplan, 514 U.S. 938, 944 (1995).
20
Howsam, 537 U.S. at 86.
21
S.I. Strong, Does Class Arbitration "Change the Nature" of Arbitration? Stolt-Nielsen, AT&T, and A Return to
First Principles, 17 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 201, 206 (2012) (citing Keating v. Superior Court, 645 P.2d 1192, 1209–
10 (Cal. 1982), rev'd on other grounds sub nom; Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1 (1984)).
22
See FED. R. CIV. P. 23.
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people or organizations seeking recourse for damages that are too small to bring suit over when
compared to the costs of litigation. 23 Under Supreme Court precedent, waivers against filing or
participating in class action suits incorporated in an arbitration clause are enforceable. 24 Class
arbitration is a unique device that imports elements of judicial class actions to adjudicate class
disputes that are subject to an arbitration clause. 25
These proceedings are often conducted according to rules promulgated by the AAA, who
published Supplementary Rules for Class Arbitrations in 2003. 26 Rule 3 of these Rules holds that
it is the arbitrator’s duty to analyze a contract to determine the availability of class arbitration. 27
The Federal Courts of Appeals are split on the question of whether incorporating the AAA Rules
of Commercial Arbitration also incorporate the Supplementary Rules for Class Arbitrations
(detailed in § V, infra).
III. THE SUPREME COURT’S ATTITUDE TOWARD CLASS ARBITRATION
The United States Supreme Court has considered class arbitrations a few times within the
last twenty years, starting with Bazzle, followed by Stolt-Nielsen, Concepcion, and Oxford
Health Plans. In these cases, the Court’s attitude toward class arbitration as a procedure has
shifted, and no decisions regarding whether class arbitrability is a procedural or substantive

23

Am. Express Co. v. Italian Colors Rest., 570 U.S. 228, 245 (2013) (Kagan, J., dissenting).
Id. at 238 (citing AT&T Mobility v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333, 351 (2011)).
25
Strong, supra note 20, at 205–06.
26
Supplementary Rules for Class Arbitrations, Am. Arb. Ass’n (rules effective Oct. 8, 2003),
https://adr.org/sites/default/files/Supplementary_Rules_for_Class_Arbitrations.pdf [hereinafter AAA Supplementary
Rules].
27
Id. at 4.
24
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question of arbitrability have stuck. These cases lay the groundwork for the consideration of the
law and policy behind AAA incorporation delegating class arbitrability. 28
The first case essential to this analysis is Green Tree Fin. Corp. v. Bazzle. 29 In Bazzle,
two separate plaintiffs in South Carolina filed claims against a lender. 30 The plaintiffs moved to
certify a class-action suit in state court, and Green Tree responded with a motion to compel
arbitration under an arbitration clause per the FAA. 31 The court certified the class, compelled
arbitration, and ordered class arbitration. 32 After arbitrators selected by Green Tree, found in
plaintiffs’ favor in both cases, Green Tree moved to vacate the arbitrator’s awards, claiming the
arbitration clause did not allow for class arbitration. 33 The South Carolina Supreme Court held
that that class arbitrations were allowed in the dispute because the clause was silent on the
matter. Green Tree appealed to the United States Supreme Court. 34
The Court ruled by a plurality (4–1–4) that under the contract’s arbitration clause, the
question should have been resolved by the arbitrator. The plurality opinion held that the contract
clause submitted all questions and controversies to the arbitrator, which included whether class
arbitration was available. 35 The Court noted that courts decide only the “gateway” issues of
substantive arbitrability that class arbitration is not one of those issues because it is a matter of
contract interpretation after arbitrability has been decided, and arbitrators are well suited to

28

Because they were decided after the Circuit cases I discuss below and did not influence those decisions, I will be
examining Epic Sys Corp. v. Lewis, 138 S. Ct. 1612 (2018) and Lamps Plus, Inc. v. Varela, 139 S. Ct. 1407 (2019),
the latest Supreme Court cases about class arbitration, below.
29
Green Tree Fin. Corp. v. Bazzle, 539 U.S. 444, (2003).
30
Id. at 448.
31
Id.
32
Id. at 449.
33
Id.
34
Id. at 449–50.
35
Id. at 451–52.
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interpret such matters. 36 In essence, Bazzle held that class arbitrability was a procedural question
for the arbitrator to decide. 37 Justice Stevens held in concurrence that South Carolina made the
right decision allowing class arbitration. However, because the plurality opinion more closely
matched his own, he joined it to avoid a deadlocked Court. 38
In addition to delegating class arbitrability to the arbitrator, Bazzle signaled the Court’s
implicit approval of class arbitration. 39 In response, the AAA created and released its
Supplementary Rules of Class Arbitrations, mere months after the Bazzle’s opinion. 40
The Court stepped back from Bazzle (but did not overrule it) in Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v.
AnimalFeeds International Corp. 41 In Stolt-Nielsen, an arbitrator certified a class arbitration in
an anti-trust claim brought against a shipping company, which decision the parties appealed all
the way to the United States Supreme Court. 42 In the lower court, the parties stipulated that the
agreement was silent on class arbitration. 43
Justice Alito penned the 5-3 majority opinion rejecting the arbitrator’s decision to allow
class arbitration. The Court took a skeptical view of class arbitration, stating that it brings
“fundamental changes” to the arbitration process: it does not solve a single dispute, but many
with a single stroke of a pen; it is not confidential (confidentiality being a large draw of
arbitration); it binds many absent parties to an arbitration award; and companies can be held

36

Id. at 453.
Id. at 451.
38
Id. at 455 (Stevens, J., concurring).
39
While the plurality decision does not discuss the merits of class arbitration as a procedure, its implicit acceptance
of class arbitration in holding that arbitrators will decide class arbitrability acted as a silent approval of the
procedure.
40
AAA Supplementary Rules, supra note 25.
41
Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds Int’l Corp., 559 U.S. 662 (2010).
42
Id. at 669–70.
43
Id. at 662.
37
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liable for large awards just like in traditional class-actions, with much less recourse for judicial
or appellate review. 44 Therefore, the Court ruled that where a contract is silent on class
arbitration, it is not allowed. 45 Overall, Stolt-Nielsen is openly skeptical of class arbitration when
compared to Bazzle’s silent acceptance.
Justice Ginsburg’s dissent held that because the parties had submitted the question of
class arbitrability directly to the arbitrator, they properly delegated the issue to the arbitrator. 46
She also disputed the majority’s skepticism toward class arbitration by noting that class
arbitrations, much like class-action suits, are often the only way for people to litigate small
claims against large companies, and therefore, should not be made more difficult to start or
join. 47
Stolt-Nielsen’s majority opinion seemed to establish that class arbitrability was not a
procedural question of arbitrability, which under the First Options 48 rule would leave the
question of whether a contract allows for class arbitration to the courts. However, Justice Alito’s
majority opinion did not address that question directly, so there was still no direct answer to the
question of “who decides” whether class arbitration is available in a silent contract.
The Court’s decision in AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion 49 doubled down on the
Court’s skepticism towards class arbitration. In addition to the misgivings expressed in StoltNielsen, Justice Scalia noted that arbitrators are generally not qualified to certify a class. 50 Justice

44

Id. at 686–87.
Id. at 687.
46
Id. at 693–96 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
47
Id. at 699.
48
First Options of Chicago, Inc. v. Kaplan, 514 U.S. 938 (1995).
49
AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333 (2011).
50
Id. at 347–51.
45
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Scalia also extended Stolt-Nielsen’s attack on class arbitration, noting, “[w]e find it hard to
believe that defendants would bet the company with no effective means of review, and even
harder to believe that Congress would have intended to allow state courts to force such a
decision.” 51 Therefore, the Court was vocally resistant of any finding that required parties to
participate in class arbitration not explicitly agreed to. 52
The Supreme Court’s ruling in Oxford Health Plans LLC v. Sutter 53 left open the
question of who decides whether class arbitration is available. 54 Instead, it seemingly took a step
back from Stolt-Nielsen by establishing that an arbitrator’s clause construction award will be
upheld under the FAA as long as the arbitrator “(even arguably) interpreted the contract.” 55
Oxford Health Plans is largely silent as to the desirability or lack thereof of class arbitration.
Therefore, Stolt-Nielsen and Concepcion spoke loudest, and both were skeptical (to put it lightly)
of class arbitration. These four decisions laid the groundwork for the subsequent circuit split on
proper delegation of class arbitrability decisions.
IV. THE CIRCUIT SPLIT
The Supreme Court’s decisions in Bazzle, Stolt-Nielsen, Concepcion, and Oxford Health
Plans left open the questions of whether the availability of class arbitration is a substantive or
procedural question of arbitrability, and of what constitutes “clear and unmistakable” delegation

51

Id. at 351.
Id.
53
Oxford Health Plans LLC v. Sutter, 569 U.S. 564 (2013).
54
The Court noted that Oxford would have had a good chance to argue that issue in this case, had they not agreed in
the lower courts to have the arbitrator decide. Id. at 569 n.2.
55
Id. at 569.
52
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of authority when it comes to class arbitration decisions. The circuits all agree that the question
of class arbitrability in the absence of a delegation is decided by courts. 56
Instead, the circuits are split on the much narrower question of whether incorporating the
procedural rules of the AAA acts as an incorporation of Rule 3 of the Supplementary Rules of
Class Arbitrations and shows “clear and unmistakable” intent to delegate the question of class
arbitrability to the arbitrator. 57
a. Initial Decisions for Courts: Reed Elsevier and the “Daisy-Chain”
The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals was the first circuit to consider this question in the
wake of Stolt-Nielsen and Concepcion in Reed Elsevier Inc. v. Crockett. 58 There, the court
considered whether class arbitration was available in a dispute between a lawyer and Reed
Elsevier Inc., owner of legal research database LexisNexis. Per the arbitration clause of his
contract with LexisNexis, Crockett filed a grievance against LexisNexis with the AAA claiming
his firm was being charged more than it agreed to in the contract. 59 The arbitration clause stated
that “any controversy, claim or counterclaim . . . arising out of this Order . . . will be resolved by
binding arbitration under this section and the then-current Commercial Rules and supervision of
the American Arbitration Association (‘AAA’).” 60 The complaint alleged two class claims for
arbitration: a class of law firms who had been overcharged, and a class of clients to whom those

56

See Reed Elsevier Inc. ex rel. LexisNexis v. Crockett, 734 F. 3d 594, 598–99 (6th Cir. 2013); Del Webb
Communities, Inc. v. Carlson, 817 F.3d 867, 873 (4th Cir. 2016); Opalinski v. Robert Half Int’l Inc., 761 F.3d 326,
335–36 (3d Cir. 2014); Catamaran Corp. v. Towncrest Pharmacy, 864 F.3d 966, 972 (8th Cir. 2017); Wells Fargo
Advisors, LLC v. Sappington, 884 F.3d 392, 395 (2d Cir. 2018) (“assume[d] without deciding”); Spirit Airlines, Inc.
v. Maizes, 899 F.3d 1230, 1232 (11th Cir. 2018); Dish Network LLC v. Ray, 900 F.3d 1240, 1243-45 (10th Cir.
2018).
57
See cases cited supra note 17.
58
Reed Elsevier, 734 F.3d at 594.
59
Id. at 596.
60
Id. at 599.
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overcharges had been passed. 61 LexisNexis responded by filing suit in the Southern District of
Ohio, asking for a declaration that the arbitration clause did not allow class arbitration and to
enjoin the filed class arbitration. 62 The Court granted summary declaratory judgment denying
class arbitration, 63 and an appeal followed. 64 The Sixth Circuit found that while the contractual
language closely mirrored the contract in Bazzle (which the Supreme Court had found to be a
proper delegation of the class arbitrability question), the fact that the contract did not mention
class arbitration meant that Stolt-Nielsen applied, and the courts would decide whether class
arbitration was available. 65
The Fourth Circuit was the next court to consider the AAA incorporation issue in Del
Webb Communities, Inc. v. Carlson. 66 In Del Webb, the parties’ dispute over construction defects
in new homes led to the invocation of an arbitration clause: “The rules of the American
Arbitration Association (AAA), published for construction industry arbitrations, shall govern the
arbitration proceeding[.]” 67 After winding through South Carolina state courts, Carlson filed a
demand for class arbitration with the AAA on behalf of approximately 2,000 other plaintiffs, at
which point the AAA case manager announced the arbitrator would decide class arbitrability.
Del Webb moved again to compel bilateral arbitration, stating the court should decide class
arbitrability. The district court found that, under Bazzle, class arbitrability is a procedural
question and that the arbitrator decides it as a matter of course, and an appeal followed. 68

61

Id.
Id.
63
Reed Elsevier, Inc. v. Crockett, No. 3:10CV248, 2012 WL 604305, at *13 (S.D. Ohio Feb. 24, 2012), aff'd sub
nom. Reed Elsevier, 734 F.3d 594 (6th Cir. 2013).
64
Reed Elsevier, 734 F.3d at 596.
65
Id. at 599–600.
66
Del Webb Communities, Inc. v. Carlson, 817 F.3d 867 (4th Cir. 2016).
67
Id. at 869.
68
Id. at 869–70.
62
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The Fourth Circuit’s opinion focuses on the Supreme Court’s criticisms of class
arbitration, as seen in Stolt-Nielsen and Concepcion. 69 Like those cases, the opinion in Del Webb
holds that because class arbitration is too different from ordinary arbitration, it is not considered
to be agreed upon in a standard arbitration clause. 70 The Fourth Circuit remanded the case to the
district court to decide arbitrability. 71 While the circuit did not make an express decision
regarding AAA incorporation as it relates to class arbitrability delegation, the fact that they
ordered the district court to decide class arbitrability under a clause incorporating AAA rules
indicates they would rule alongside the Sixth, Third, and Eighth Circuits in finding that AAA
incorporation is not a valid delegation.
The Third Circuit Court of Appeals has considered class arbitration issues on several
occasions. In 2014, the circuit held as a preliminary matter that the availability of class
arbitration is a question of substantive arbitrability for the court to decide. 72 The court then ruled
in Chesapeake Appalachia, LLC v. Scout Petroleum, LLC 73 that AAA incorporation does not
delegate class arbitrability to the arbitrator. In Chesapeake, parties to a mineral rights lease
disputed royalties owed under the contract. 74 The arbitration clause held, in relevant part:
“[D]isagreement between Lessor and Lessee . . . shall be determined by arbitration in accordance
with the rules of the American Arbitration Association.” 75 After Scout Petroleum filed a class
arbitration with the AAA, Chesapeake filed for declaratory judgment with the Middle District of

69

The court cited Stolt-Nielsen’s holding that class arbitration is so fundamentally different as to constitute a
different procedure, and Concepcion’s holding that because arbitration awards cannot be appealed, companies are
more likely to suffer grievous losses to an arbitral mistake versus the lesser amounts at stake in most bilateral
arbitrations. Id. at 875–76 (citing Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds Int’l Corp., 559 U.S. 662, 685 (2010) and AT
& T Mobility LLC. v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333, 350 (2011).
70
Del Webb, 817 F.3d at 876–77.
71
Id. at 877.
72
Opalinski v. Robert Half Int’l Inc., 761 F.3d 326, 335–36 (3d Cir. 2014).
73
Chesapeake Appalachia, LLC v. Scout Petroleum, LLC, 809 F.3d 746 (3d Cir. 2016).
74
Id. at 748.
75
Id. at 749.
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Pennsylvania in April 2014, asking that the court declare class arbitration was not available. The
motion was denied, sending the question of class arbitrability to the arbitrators. On July 30,
2014, the Third Circuit released its opinion in Opalinski that availability of class arbitration is for
the court to decide. The arbitrators soon ruled that the incorporation of the AAA rules acted as a
clear and unmistakable delegation of authority to the arbitrators and asked the parties to submit
briefs as to whether class arbitration was allowed. 76 Chesapeake filed with the court to vacate the
class construction award, which the court granted because the award was contrary to Opalinski. 77
After multiple district courts found they would decide class arbitrability in cases against
Chesapeake Appalachia, 78 Scout Petroleum and other plaintiffs appealed to the Third Circuit to
resolve the issue of whether AAA incorporation was “clear and unmistakable” enough to
delegate the class arbitrability decision to the arbitrator. 79
The Court concluded that the arbitration clauses did not overcome the “onerous burden”
to conclude that courts decide class arbitrability. 80 The opinion heavily cited Reed Elsevier,
Opalinski, Stolt-Nielsen, and Oxford Health Plans to support its decision, but the most
interesting analysis in the decision concerns the “daisy-chain of cross-references” required to
find a delegation of authority through AAA incorporation. 81 The court laid out the chain as such:
in order to find a delegation, a court must look first to the lease, which incorporates the AAA
rules. 82 Rule 1 of the AAA Rules of Commercial Arbitration holds that unless contracted

76

Id. at 751.
Id. at 752.
78
While it is beyond the scope of this article, a full examination of the procedural and arbitral history of Chesapeake
would make a fascinating case study on the interweaving of arbitration and litigation and whether arbitration is
really cheaper or faster than litigation in the current legal climate.
79
Chesapeake Appalachia, 809 F.3d 746.
80
Id. at 758.
81
Id. at 758–61.
82
Id. at 749.
77
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otherwise, AAA incorporation clauses refer to the Rules of Commercial Arbitration. 83 Rule 7 of
those rules delegates authority to the arbitrator to decide their own jurisdiction. 84 The court
found that at the time of their decision, there was no direct reference in the Rules of Commercial
Arbitration to the Supplementary Rules of Class Arbitrations. However, the court found that they
would have to make a jump to the Supplementary Rules of Class Arbitrations to answer the “who
decides class arbitration” question. Specifically, a court would have to go to Rule 3 of the
Supplementary Rules to find that the AAA rules delegate the ability to certify a class to
arbitrators. 85 However, the Court found that because there are no references in the Rules of
Commercial Arbitration to the Supplementary Rules, the leap from AAA incorporation to
delegation of class arbitrability is a step too far to be “clear and unmistakable.” 86 Thus, the Third
Circuit held that AAA incorporation is not a sufficient delegation of authority to decide class
arbitrability.
The Eighth Circuit became the most recent to rule that AAA incorporation is not a proper
delegation of authority to decide class arbitrability in Catamaran Corp. v. Towncrest
Pharmacy. 87 In this case, a putative class of over eighty-five pharmacies claiming they had not
been paid under a prescription drug benefits plan filed for a class arbitration with the AAA, per
their contract holding that disputes would be arbitrated by the AAA according to its rules.
Catamaran filed suit in district court seeking declaratory judgment that the contract did not allow

83

Id.
Id. at 749–50.
85
Id. at 762.
86
The Court found that while the overwhelming weight of case law indicates that AAA incorporation is a valid
delegation of arbitrability questions to arbitrators in bilateral arbitrations, they followed Stolt-Nielsen in holding that
class arbitrations are sufficiently different procedures to justify creating a new rule. Id. at 763–65.
87
Catamaran Corp. v. Towncrest Pharmacy, 864 F.3d 966 (8th Cir. 2017).
84
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for class arbitration. 88 The district court denied Catamaran’s summary judgment motion, finding
that incorporation of AAA rules was a proper delegation to the arbitrator to decide class
arbitrability, and Catamaran appealed. 89
The Eighth Circuit found the district court would decide class arbitrability in the presence
of a AAA incorporation. 90 Their decision explicitly followed the Sixth Circuit’s skepticism
toward class arbitration in Reed Elsevier and the Third Circuit’s finding in Chesapeake that AAA
incorporation is not proper delegation. Thus, the Court overruled the district court’s summary
judgment and remanded for the district court to determine class arbitrability. 91
Thus, by the end of 2017, four circuits had held that AAA incorporation is not
sufficiently clear and unmistakable delegation to overcome the strong presumption that a court
should decide class arbitrability. The Sixth Circuit led the charge in Reed Elsevier by holding
that the significant differences between bilateral and class arbitration means an explicit
delegation of authority is required for an arbitrator to decide class arbitrability. Then, the Fourth
Circuit applied the Supreme Court’s skepticism against class arbitration in reaching a similar
decision in Del Webb. The Third Circuit in Chesapeake expanded on these holdings, noting that
finding a clear delegation of authority through incorporation of the AAA rules requires a “daisychain” of cross-references that takes a court far afield of the actual text of the contract. With the
Eighth Circuit’s decision in Catamaran marking the Fourth Circuit to rule in favor of courts
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deciding class arbitrability with no dissent, the answer to the question of AAA incorporation
could safely have been said to be “well-settled law.”
b. Opening the Split: Sappington and Its Progeny
However, in 2018, three circuits went against the tide and opened a circuit split. The
Second Circuit opened the split in Wells Fargo Advisors, Inc. v. Sappington. 92 There, two
separate groups of employees filed class arbitration claims for unpaid overtime with both the
Financial Industry Regulatory Authority (“FINRA”) and the AAA per their employment
contracts, which required FINRA to arbitrate all disputes and AAA to arbitrate if FINRA
rejected the claim. 93 One of the clauses in dispute specifically stated, “[a]ny controversy relating
to your duty to arbitrate . . . or enforceability of this arbitration clause . . . shall also be arbitrated
before the FINRA.” 94 After FINRA declined to arbitrate because it forbids class arbitration,
Wells Fargo moved to compel bilateral arbitration in all claims before the AAA per the
employment contract, which the district court declined. Wells Fargo then appealed to the Second
Circuit. 95
The Second Circuit “assumed without deciding” that class arbitrability is a gateway
matter for the courts to decide, absent clear and unmistakable evidence that the parties agreed
otherwise. 96 However, the Second Circuit found that under Missouri law, the delegation of “any
controversy or dispute,” buffered by their exclusion of specific controversies from arbitration,
indicated a clear delegation to decide all disputes about arbitrability to the arbitrator. 97 They then
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tackled Chesapeake’s “daisy-chain” reasoning directly, holding that by incorporating the 1993
AAA rules into the contract, the parties agreed to Rule 1’s provision that the AAA’s rules in
effect at the time arbitration commences will be enforced. 98 Therefore, the 2013 edition of the
Commercial Arbitration Rules and Rule 3 of the Supplementary Rules for Class Arbitrations
both applied and delegated authority to the arbitrator. 99 They responded to Wells Fargo’s “chain
of inferences” argument by noting that Missouri state law necessitates full incorporation of the
rules. The Second Circuit then criticized its sister circuits for “apparently” ignoring state law in
holding that incorporation was not a sufficient delegation. 100 While the Second Circuit
acknowledged the issues of class arbitration as laid out in Chesapeake and Catamaran, it found
the arbitration clause to be clear enough to warrant allowing the arbitrator to decide class
arbitrability. 101
Next, the Eleventh Circuit weighed in with Spirit Airlines, Inc. v. Maizes. 102 There, a
group of Spirit customers claimed the airline was breaking promises in fare-club agreements. 103
Spirit sued in the Southern District of Florida seeking a declaration stating that the clause did not
allow class arbitration. The clause informed that “[a]ny dispute arising between Members and
Spirit will be resolved by . . . arbitration . . . in accordance with the rules of the American
Arbitration Association then in effect.” The district court granted the class representatives’
motion to dismiss the suit, and Spirit Airlines appealed. 104
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The Eleventh Circuit found incorporation of the AAA rules gives clear and unmistakable
delegation of authority to the arbitrator. Precedent informed proper delegation from AAA
incorporation in a bilateral arbitrability dispute. 105 The court was unconvinced by its sister
circuits’ decisions contrary to Reed Elsevier. One such case, Stolt-Nielsen, did not justify holding
class arbitrability to a different standard than bilateral arbitrability. 106 Finally, the court looked at
the clause through Florida contract law, which supported delegation as well. 107 Thus, although
the decision never cited Sappington, the Eleventh Circuit agreed with the Second Circuit’s
reasoning in finding proper delegation through AAA incorporation.
The Tenth Circuit followed Maizes ten days later in its Dish Network, LLC v. Ray
opinion. 108 There, an arbitration clause between Dish Network and an employee incorporated the
AAA rules, but had no other express delegation clauses 109 (unlike the contract in Sappington,
which textually delegated almost all authority to the arbitrator 110). The parties initially submitted
clause construction to the arbitrator, who ruled both that they had the authority to decide class
arbitrability, and that class arbitration was allowed under the contract. 111 Dish Network moved to
vacate, was denied, and appealed to the Tenth Circuit. 112
The court found under both Tenth Circuit precedent and Colorado state law that the broad
language of the contract incorporated Rule 7 of the AAA Commercial Arbitration Rules and
Rule 3 of the Supplementary Rules for Class Arbitrations. 113 Thus, it was a clear delegation to
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the arbitrator to decide their own jurisdiction. 114 It also reasoned by example from a series of
cases holding incorporation of the JAMS (a different arbitration organization) rules of arbitration
constituted a proper delegation of class arbitrability decisions. 115 It additionally incorporated
Sappington’s critique of the other circuits’ decisions. 116 Therefore, Ray deepened the circuit split
and raised questions about the incorporation of other arbitration organization rules.
There are a few common threads to pull from these decisions. First is the greater reliance
on state law. The pro-court decisions rarely, if ever, relied on state cases in examining the AAA
incorporation issues, while Sappington, Maizes, and Ray all relied on their interpretations of state
law in their opposite rulings. 117 Additionally, these cases rejected Reed Elsevier and StoltNielsen by finding that class arbitration is not so different from bilateral arbitration to warrant
different treatment under the delegation doctrine. 118 Finally, they rejected Chesapeake’s “daisychain” reasoning by noting that, per state law, incorporation of arbitral organization rules acts as
a full incorporation and does not trigger a chain of references analysis. 119
V. RESOLVING THE SPLIT
Therefore, at the time of writing, there was a four to three split on the question of whether
AAA incorporation is a proper delegation of class arbitrability decisions. The primary
disagreements fall along two lines: interpretation of the Supreme Court’s attitude toward class
arbitration and whether the leap from AAA incorporation to AAA Supplementary Rules for
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Class Arbitrations Rule 3 is too attenuated to be read as a “clear and unmistakable” delegation of
authority to the arbitrator.
The “improper delegation” camp (led by the Sixth Circuit) cites the Supreme Court’s
skepticism of class arbitration by ruling that because class arbitrations are so fundamentally
different from bilateral arbitrations they require precise delegation language. 120 Additionally, the
Third Circuit in Chesapeake laid out a strong argument that the chain of cross-references
required to move from incorporating AAA rules to finding delegation of class arbitrability is too
attenuated to be “clear and unmistakable.” 121
The “proper delegation” camp (led by the Second Circuit) responds by arguing that their
sister courts did not properly apply state law, 122 that the differences between class arbitration and
bilateral arbitration are not large enough to warrant different treatment, 123 and the “daisy-chain”
is not long enough to violate the “clear and unmistakable” standard. 124 These positions on the
AAA incorporation issue are mutually exclusive, so when the Supreme Court weighs in there
will be a winner and a loser. How will this split be resolved?
a. Author’s Solution
If I were on the Supreme Court deciding this issue, my opinion would focus heavily on
Howsam’s “clear and unmistakable” delegation standard. 125 As an initial matter, I would agree
with the circuits in holding that class arbitrability is an issue of substantive arbitrability that is
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left to the court absent clear delegation otherwise. 126 I hold as such because class arbitration uses
a radically different set of rules from traditional bilateral arbitration, so finding it to be a mere
“procedural” difference from bilateral arbitration does not make sense. 127 Therefore, I would rule
in accord with the Courts of Appeals that class arbitrability is a substantive question for the
courts to decide (absent proper delegation).
As to the matter of AAA incorporation, I find the Third Circuit’s “daisy-chain of cross
references” reasoning in Chesapeake 128 to be persuasive. Under Howsam, courts decide
questions of substantive arbitrability unless the contract “clearly and unmistakably provide[s]
otherwise.” 129 In situations where a contract is ambiguous or silent on delegation, courts
presumptively decide. 130 Taking Howsam’s requirement for a “clear and unmistakable
delegation” at face value, a clause that arbitration is controlled by the rules of the AAA does not
textually establish that an arbitrator will decide class arbitrability. Rule 1 of the AAA Rules of
Commercial Arbitration states that incorporation of AAA rules refers to the Rules of
Commercial Arbitration unless otherwise stated. The Rules of Commercial Arbitration, in turn,
do not mention class arbitration or the Supplementary Rules thereof. 131 Because the Commercial
Arbitration Rules do not mention class arbitration or the Supplementary Rules, analysis of the
contract then takes the reader further afield to find an answer to the question of “who decides
class arbitrability.” Following this chain requires one to find the AAA’s Supplementary Rules for
Class Arbitrations, then finally Rule 3 delegating authority to the arbitrator. 132 Because finding
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delegation requires looking outside not only the text of the contract, but outside the incorporated
Commercial Arbitration Rules to the unmentioned Supplementary Rules of Class Arbitrations
(requiring analysis three steps removed from the contract), the leap from AAA incorporation to
delegation of class arbitrability is too attenuated to meet the “clear and unmistakable” standard
established by Howsam.
Another important factor is party expectations. When reviewing for arbitrability and
delegation, courts are instructed to follow relevant state laws to determine the intent of the
parties. 133 In doing so, courts must determine whether parties would expect a court to decide the
question. 134 Per Stolt-Nielsen, silence on class arbitration is not seen as acceptance of class
arbitration. 135 It is reasonable to assume that attorneys drafting an arbitration clause that does not
explicitly mention class arbitration would expect courts to decide whether or not class arbitration
is available. 136 By leaving class arbitrability with the courts absent a clear delegation, party
expectations in the wake of Stolt-Nielsen will be upheld.
Finally, my analysis advances the policy of protecting unsophisticated parties. Signers of
consumer and employment contracts are often unrepresented and have little to no legal training.
Courts should encourage clear and careful contract drafting that uses plain language so
unrepresented parties understand what they are agreeing to. My resolution of the AAA
incorporation question limits contractual analysis to only the text of the contract and to the
incorporated AAA Rules of Commercial Arbitration (available to even unsophisticated parties

133

First Options, 514 U.S. at 944.
Howsam, 537 U.S. at 83.
135
Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds Int’l Corp., 559 U.S. 662, 686–87 (2010).
136
Further assuming they even considered the possibility of class arbitration while drafting the clause. In cases
where the drafters did not contemplate class arbitration, they would also have a valid expectation to have a court
review the contract to determine whether they agreed to class arbitration.
134

146

via internet search). Therefore, unrepresented parties who take time to research a contract before
signing can determine what they are agreeing to without having to hire an attorney to follow the
daisy-chain to the Supplementary Rules. Ruling that AAA incorporation is a proper delegation
would require unrepresented parties to have the knowledge and resources to be able to follow the
daisy-chain and be able to understand what a class arbitration is and who will decide if it is
available. While this policy argument can be easily countered by pointing out that an
unsophisticated party would not even know what delegation is, let alone how to check for it, an
overarching policy favoring clear contract drafting requires ruling this way even on obscure legal
issues in order to set precedent that encourages drafting more easily-understood contracts.
Because class arbitrability is a substantive question of arbitrability, the leap from AAA
incorporation to the Supplementary Rules of Class Arbitrations is too attenuated, parties would
reasonably expect a court to decide class arbitrability absent clear delegation, and public policy
favors encouraging plain language in contracts to protect unsophisticated parties. Therefore, I
would side with the circuits that rule AAA incorporation does not delegate class arbitrability.
b. The Supreme Court’s Solution
The real question, however, is how the Supreme Court will rule on this issue. I predict the
Court will rule AAA incorporation to not be sufficient delegation, but for different reasons.
Specifically, the Court’s skepticism of class arbitration, as discussed above, will play a large role
in finding no delegation. I base this conclusion on the changes to the Court since Oxford Health
Plans and the positions the new justices staked out in Epic Systems Corp. v. Lewis 137 and Lamps
Plus, Inc., v. Varela. 138
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I examined the high Court’s skepticism above, but to review: in Stolt-Nielsen, the Court
held that class arbitration changes the nature of arbitration by including parties not subject to the
contract, resolving many ongoing and potential disputes at once, binding absent parties to that
resolution, and subjects defendants to massive liability without effective appellate review. 139
Concepcion echoed these concerns, also adding that class arbitration takes longer and is more
expensive than bilateral arbitration, and that many arbitrators are not qualified to handle class
certification. 140
However, the Court has welcomed two new justices since the decisions in Stolt-Nielsen
and Concepcion. In 2017, Justice Gorsuch filled Justice Scalia’s vacant seat, 141 and Justice
Kavanaugh replaced Justice Kennedy in 2018. 142 Scalia and Kennedy both ruled with the
majority opinions in Stolt-Nielsen and Concepcion, so replacing them may have caused a change
in the Court’s opinion toward class arbitration. However, examination of the Court’s recent class
arbitration decisions shows that the majority will not shift its skepticism to class arbitration. 143
In 2018, the Court released its opinion in Epic Systems Corp. v. Lewis. 144 Epic Systems
resolved several cases concerning a National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) decision creating a
right under the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) for employees to demand class arbitration
even through a valid class-action waiver. 145 Then-new Justice Gorsuch wrote for the majority,
finding the NLRB decision to be in error because the agency overstepped its bounds in issuing a
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ruling that infringed on the FAA, so the Court brought the ruling in harmony with the FAA. 146
The opinion firmly stood by Concepcion 147 and rejected Justice Ginsburg’s NLRA and public
policy-based defense of class arbitration as a tool for workers to combat exploitive employers 148
by noting that a “mountain of precedent” supports the Court’s policy favoring arbitration. 149 The
Court has a duty to find a balance between seemingly conflicting federal statutes (like the NLRA
and FAA in this case). 150 Epic Systems showed that Justice Gorsuch respects Stolt-Nielsen’s and
Concepcion’s skepticism towards class arbitration, as well as the Court’s overwhelming policy in
favor of arbitration.
In 2019, the Supreme Court decided Lamps Plus, Inc. v. Varela, the most recent Supreme
Court decision to deal with class arbitration. 151 There, the parties asked the Court to resolve the
question of class arbitrability in a case involving a contract ambiguous (but not silent) about
class arbitration. 152 Justices Gorsuch and Kavanaugh signed Chief Justice Robert’s majority
opinion that extended Stolt-Nielsen to forbid finding class arbitrability in ambiguous as well as
silent contracts. 153 The decision heavily quoted Stolt-Nielsen, Concepcion, and Epic Systems in
laying out the familiar arguments holding class arbitration in a separate category from bilateral
arbitration when construing arbitration agreements. 154 Because the new Justices signed onto this
opinion echoing past skepticism of class arbitration, it is logical to assume that they will continue
to follow that policy in the future. Both Epic Systems and Lamps Plus were clean 5-4 splits
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between the “conservative” and “liberal” wings of the Court, showing that this Court will
maintain the skepticism against class arbitration well into the future. 155
Analyzing this skepticism is important because it will play a major role in the Supreme
Court’s decision to rule in favor of the courts deciding class arbitrability in AAA incorporation
cases. As discussed above, logic dictates that arbitrators are much more likely to find class
arbitrability than a court because it allows them to bill more hours and they believe they can
handle the complexity of class certification (despite Justice Scalia’s contrary belief 156). Courts,
bound by the Supreme Court’s precedential skepticism toward class arbitrations and the multiple
rulings against finding class arbitrability in Stolt-Nielsen, Concepcion, Epic Systems, and Lamps
Plus, are unlikely to find class arbitrability.
Because it will reduce the amount of class arbitrations initiated, the Supreme Court will
rule that delegation on class arbitrability must be explicit to qualify under Howsam, and
incorporation of the AAA rules is not “clear and unmistakable” enough to delegate that
authority.
c. Effects of This Decision
A decision in favor of courts on this issue will have some immediate effects on drafters
and signers of arbitration clauses, and on the general practice of contract drafting to account for
class arbitrations.
The likely positive effect of such a decision will be to encourage more careful drafting of
arbitration clauses. Because drafters will (in theory) have to explicitly consider class arbitration
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when writing clauses, they will write more detailed clauses that will be easier to understand
based purely on the text of the contract. Those who wish to delegate class arbitrability will have
to do so explicitly, leading to more careful drafting. Another positive effect will be the reduction
of litigation around AAA and other organization incorporations, because the question of class
arbitrability delegation has been answered, reducing case load in the federal courts.
However, the reduced availability of class arbitration will make it much harder for parties
to class-action waivers to combine their claims in arbitration, leading to further reduction of the
ability to effectively vindicate smaller claims. 157 Additionally, this ruling will close a loophole
currently available in the “proper delegation” circuits that allows a class to use AAA
incorporation as a work-around to class-action waivers. Finally, contracting costs may increase
as more time is required to draft and revise arbitration clauses to take note of class arbitration
possibilities.
VI. CONCLUSION
The circuit split on the question of AAA incorporation’s delegation of class arbitrability
opens a fascinating window on the state of arbitral procedure, principles of contract construction,
and the judiciary’s role in the evolution of a private parallel to class-action lawsuits. Resolving
this question is important because it has opened a circuit split with mutually exclusive decisions
and clouds the law around class arbitration. Although there is not currently an answer, an
examination of the Supreme Court’s skeptical view of class arbitration shows it is likely the
Court will side with the Sixth, Fourth, Third, and Eighth circuits by finding AAA incorporation
is NOT a proper delegation of the class arbitrability decision to the arbitrator.
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